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TAX COMMENT
Faculty Advisor-BENJAMIN HARROW, A.B., J.D., C.P.A.
Editor-WILLIAM H. SHAPIRO
ESTATE TAx-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY.-Husband and wife
became possessed of real and personal property as tenants by the
entirety in 1917. On the death of the husband, the property was
considered part of the gross estate in computing the Federal estate
tax. Deceased's administrator sued to recover the tax so paid on the
grounds, (a) that it was a direct tax, without apportionment, and
therefore invalid as it (b) constituted a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. Held, that since the surviving spouse acquired
the rights of sole proprietorship, the property was validly included
for purpose of taxation. Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup Ct.
356 (1930).
Under the common law joint tenants constituted a unit in legal
contemplation so that neither tenant could dispose of any part of the
estate without the consent of the other.1 On the other hand, the
husband had the right to control and dispose of all the profits of the
property and he could convey the land to divest the wife of posses-
sion during his life, and even to vest a good estate in a grantee,
provided he survived his wife.2 As long as there was an accrual of
benefit to the survivor at the death of the husband the imposition of
the tax was proper.3 Since the power of taxation is an essential arm
of all government, legal technicalities should not deter the assessment.
There is no doubt that death became the "generating source" of
definite accession of property rights to the survivor.4 The Court in
this case, mindful of the device employed for tax avoidance, met the
issue squarely. From the point of view of a previous decision,5 the
complete change of the Court's position in interpreting the tax statute
is a welcomed one, and it indicates the awakening of the Court to
modes of tax evasion, together with an interpretation that will not
frustrate the apparent intention of the Legislature.
W. H. S.
'United States v. Provident Trust Co., 33 F. (2nd) 724 (C. C. A., 4th,
1929); see (Note) (1930) 18 Cal. L. Rev. 302.
21 Tiffany Real Estate (1920), 652.
3 Reinecke v. Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929).
Sutherland, J., at 559.
'May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 50 Sup. Ct. 286 (1930) ; see Note (1930)
5 St. John's L. Rev. 147.
